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The Shreveport Plan for 
Providing Legal Services 
Richard R Clifton Since January, 1971, the members of Local 229 
of the Laborers' International Union of North America 
have been covered by the "Shreveport Prepaid Legal Service 
Plan," a program popularly described as '1egal insurance." 
Briefly, '1egal insurance"1 calls for payment of premiums 
by individuals into a fund which is used to pay the fees of 
lawyers selected and hired by members when they need 
legal help. It may prove to facilitate the delivery of legal 
services to middle-class citizens, who today may be 
deprived of some of the legal assistance they need. The 
Shreveport program was instigated by the American Bar 
Association to test the concept; and the American Bar 
Foundation, a legal research institute affiliated with the 
A.B.A., was asked to observe and report on it.2 
This article is intended to highlight the A.B.F. 
report; anyone with a further interest in the subject, 
including the detailed descriptions, statistics and analysis, 
should refer to the full report.3 The focus of our concerns 
here is the availability and use of legal services by persons 
of moderate income-in particular the failure to use such 
services when they would seem advantageous, the extent 
and reasons for such non-use, and the observed effects of 
the legal insurance plan on that pattern.4 
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291 The Background: 
Delivering Legal Services 
The 1960s marked a decade of increased 
prominence for the law and lawyers' services, contributed 
to by the activism of the judiciary, in particular the 
Supreme Court, as well as by increased efforts for providing 
legal assistance to low-income citizens, realized in the 
development of the O.E.O. Legal Services Program and the 
expansion of local legal aid offices. Supreme Court 
decisions, headed by Gideon v. Wainwright, 5 which 
required.that counsel be provided free of charge to criminal 
defendants who could not afford their own, further 
emphasized the importance of legal services. 
The idea of providing legal services has quickly 
expanded to include coverage of the middle class as well as 
of the poor. If legal services are "needed" by low-income 
people, the argument goes, the rest of the populace could 
find them useful as well, particularly persons of "moderate 
income." The poor may be able to go to legal aid offices, 
and commercial and wealthy clients can afford to hire 
private attorneys on their own, but the individuals in the 
middle often seem left out. The definition of this neglected 
group varies, but all agree that it is large. In what is 
probably the best book on the subject, Lawyers for People 
of Moderate Means by Barlow F. Christensen, it is 
estimated that this moderate-income group, if encom-
passing those with annual incomes between $5,000 and 
$15,000, would include at least 60 percent of the nation's 
families (or would have in 1963).6 For these middle-income 
persons, it is thought, attorneys are too often financially 
out of reach, implying the existence of a substantial 
unfulfilled need here for legal services. 
How can attorneys fulfill this need? One 
widely-recognized answer is the use of established 
groups-unions, political associations, ethnic and fraternal 
clubs and the like-as the channels for bringing clients and 
lawyers together. Programs providing legal assistance 
through such groups for purposes related to the group's 
function have been a natural development. For example, 
the NAACP has furnished and paid for counsel in civil 
rights cases, 7 and some unions have arranged for lawyers to 
handle workmen's compensation claims.8 These plans do 
not always limit themselves to group-related problems, but 
occasionally provide formally or informally, for legal 
assistance for a broader range of matters. 9 
1 There has been some question about the 
use ofthe term "legal insurance" in 
referring to this kind of program. The 
organized bar has shifted to the rather 
unwieldy phrase "prepaid legal service 
plan." at least in part because of laws 
and regulations apP,lying to ''insurance" 
programs. In addition, it is true that the 
primary grou~oriented alternative to 
the concept-closed-panel group legal 
services-also contains elements of 
''insurance," notably pooling of risks. 
Nonetheless, "legal insurance" is a 
convenient term to use, and since it has 
been commonly employed, it will be 
used here to refer to the Shreveport plan 
and the open-panel concept. 
2 The report of that investigation-The 
Shreveport Plan: An Experiment in 
Delivery of Legal Services by F. 
Raymond Marks, Robert Paul Hallauer, 
and Richard R. Oifton with the 
assistance of Phyllis Munro Satkus-is 
being published in the spring of 1973. It 
evaluates the results of the experiment 
and provides certain insights into a 
subject about which too little is known: 
the relationship of the "average citizen" 
to lawyers, including the use and 
non-use of legal services. 
3 The report may be ordered from the 
American Bar Foundation, 1155 East 
60th St., Chicago, lli. 60637. Because 
the pagination of the published edition 
was not settled at the time of this 
writing, direct references to it cannot be 
given here. The summary offered in the 
last chapter may serve as an index to 
subjects, however; and it can be 
consulted for quick references. 
4 Before continuing I must acknowledge 
the involvement of my colleagues in this 
article. The report was a group project, 
under the direction of Mr. Marks. Most 
of the ideas and some of the words used 
here were spawned by that effort. 
5 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). 
6 B. Christensen, Lawyers for People of 
Moderate Means 5, n. 4 (1970). 
7 Such a program was the subject of 
controversy in NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963). 
8 As in Brotherhood of Railroad 
Trainmen v. Vuginia, ex rel. Virginia 
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), and 
United Mine Workers of American, 
District 12 v. Illinois State Bar 
Association, 389 U.S 217 (1967). 
9 A broader plan has included, for 
example, the preparation of wills and 
assistance in divorce proceedings. See 
United Transportation Union v. The 
State Bar of Michigan, 410 U.S. 576 
(1971). 
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292 Basing the delivery of legal services on groups is 
an idea that has spread and attracted considerable 
attention. One A.B.A. official estimated in 1972 that there 
were at least 3,000 group arrangements of various types 
then in existence. 10 In California alone there were said to 
be almost 200 groups covering more than 300,000 people 
in early 1971. 11 Moreover, these existing groups represent 
merely a tiny fraction of the potential. For the great 
majority of potentially interest parties, such group 
arrangements remain subjects for discussion concerning 
possible implementation in the future. 12 
In looking at group programs it is important to 
recognize that they differ greatly among themselves in 
terms of benefit coverage, membership, financing and 
mechanics. One variable in particular that has attracted 
considerable attention is the means by which an attorney is 
selected under the plan. In most of the programs which 
exist today, the group not only pays for the attorney, but · 
selects him as well. The member is simply referred to a 
particular lawyer, or at most is given a short list of names to 
choose from. This may be described as a "closed-panel" 
plan, and the concept is commonly known as "group legal 
services." On the other hand, the group may restrict itself 
to paying the legal fees, permitting the member to freely 
choose his own lawyer. This "open panel" alternative has 
been labeled "legal insurance," under which financing of 
legal services is accomplished by group contribution and 
pooling of risk, otherwise leaving the member on his own. 
A great deal has been written about these 
proposals, 13 especially the difference between open- and 
closed-panel systems. The organized bar has objected 
vigorously to closed-panel arrangements. It originally 
,expressed its opposition as a concern for professional 
ethics, trying to use its power of self-regulation to block 
closed-panel plans on the grounds that they violated rules 
against unauthorized practice of law and practicing law 
through intermediaries. 14 When the organized bar 
attempted to enforce ethical regulations against group legal 
·services, however, the Supreme Court stepped in and 
effectively eliminated the restrictions. In a series of four 
cases, each raised by a state or state bar's attempt to block 
a closed-panel arrangement, the Court rejected the ethical 
core of bar opposition to group services as an infringement 
on the First Amendment right of association. 15 
Faced with these decisions, an A.B.A. 
committee-the Special Committee on Availability of Legal 
Services-recommended that the bar accept closed-panel 
programs and adopt a proposed set of regulations which 
provided minimum safeguards against exploitation and 
abuse, required written agreements, and established the 
existing disciplinary structure of the bar and the judiciary 
in the role of supervisor, with power to enforce the 
regulations. 16 
To underscore its fundamental opposition to 
group legal service programs, however, the A.B.A. House of 
Delegates at its 1968 annual meeting instead adopted, as 
part of its Code of Professional Responsibility, a prohibi-
tion against group arrangements, leaving a single exception: 
only in those instances and to the extent that 
controlling constitutional interpretation at the 
time of the rendition of the service requires the 
allowance of such legal services. 17 
In other words, the A.B.A. accepted group legal 
services only to the extent required by Supreme Court 
decisions, and no further. 
Although generally couched in ethical terms, in 
actuality the opposition of the bar is based on somewhat 
more complex concerns. 18 Many lawyers fear that 
closed-panel plans will result in control by the intermediary 
groups over legal practice, changing the lawyer from a 
professional to a service employee, to the detriment of both 
the quality of service rendered and the lawyer's independ-
ence. If an organization exercises some control over their 
selected attorneys, there is danger to the individual litigant 
if his interests in a particular case collide with those of the 
organization. Even where there is no conflict of interest, it 
is feared that the attorney may be more vulnerable to 
outside pressure, or feel less responsible to the specific 
interests of the individual if his livelihood is controlled, 
instead, by a group. In addition; much of the bar's hostility 
seems to rest on concern about unfair competition among 
lawyers, since a closed-panel plan excludes those not on the 
panel from getting any of the group's business. One factor 
of the highest importance is the frank fear that an increase 
in groups offering the services of a lawyer to their members 
will result in shifts in practices with serious economic 
consequences for members of the profession: the law 
practice now enjoyed by some private practitioners may go 
to other lawyers retained or employed by groups. 19 
Moreover, the lure of the possible financial bonanza in 
being a group's "designated" attorney, or the threat of 
being left out in the cold without such a designation, might 
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293 produce an irresistable temptation .to violate the profes-
sion's long-standing regulations against advertising or 
solicitation of business, or even those against "paying off," 
financially or other wise, the group's officials. Many other 
lawyers and observers deprecate these fears, of course. But 
it is evident that the observation that "group legal services 
are dreaded, perhaps even despised, by most practicing 
lawyers" 20 is not without foundation and cannot be 
ignored. 
The Supreme Court's protection of group 
service plans and the continued growth of such arrange-
ments has forced lawyers to re-evaluate-or, for many, 
evaluate seriously for the first time-attitudes toward group 
delivery of legal services. The concept of legal insurance is 
not new but only now in the context of this judicial favor 
for group services, and the fact of their continued growth 
has it been embraced by the legal profession. Legal 
insurance offers a viable alternative to closed-panel 
programs, since it allows for the separation of arrangements 
for payments for services from group control of lawyer 
selection and the threat of group interference with the 
lawyer-client relationship. 
The bar's recognition of open-panel, legal 
insurance as an attractive alternative to group legal services 
was exhibited during the 1968 A.B.A. convention. After 
having rejected the proposals permitting regulated group 
service plans, the convention considered and accepted 
another report from the same special committee which 
favored the idea of legal insurance and called for its further 
examination. 21 As there had not previously been any 
actual full-service legal insurance programs, however, there 
remained several unanswered questions about how well 
such a program would work. A field test was needed. A call 
went out to local bar associations for volunteers. The 
Shreveport plan was the eventual result. 
The idea of legal insurance can be realized in 
many different ways. The Shreveport experiment is 
deliberately designed as broadly inclusive. It covers virtually 
all types of legal problems. All active members of the union 
chosen for the experiment, and their dependents are 
included, the fund being supported by a contribution of 
two cents per hour worked, taken from the member's 
paycheck. The schedule of benefits is broad, with liberal 
maximum annual benefit limits and small deductable 
charges. If the upper limits of each category of benefits are 
added together, the plan could be responsible for $1,665 a 
year in coverage for a single member. 22 
10 Murphy, Group Legal Service Plans in 
California, Florida, Maryland, and 
Oregon, 36 Unauthorized Practice News 
7 (June, 1972). 
11 Plant, Increasing Availability of Legal 
Services, 46 J.St.B. of Ca. 442, 444 
(1971). 
12 Union officials in particular have 
expressed interest. See Bernstein, Legal 
Services, the Bar, and the Unions, 58 
A.B.A.J. 472 (1972). 
13 Both a comprehensive discussion and 
extensive list of bibliographic references 
may be found in B. Christensen, supra n. 
5. Especially notable on the idea of legal 
insurance is Stolz, Insurance for Legal 
Services: A Preliminary Study of 
Feasibility, 35 U.Chi.L.Rev. 417 (1968). 
14 For a discussion of the ethical issues, see 
Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the 
Constitution, 16 Yale L.J. 966 (1967). 
15 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); 
Brotherhood of Railraod Trainmen v. 
Virginia, ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 
U.S. l (1964); United Mine Workers of 
America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar 
Association, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); 
United Transportation Union v. The 
State Bar of Michigan, 410 U.S. 576 
(1971). 
16 A.BA. Spec. Comm. on A vailabiliry of 
Legal Services, Report Number 2, 93 
Reports of the A.B.A. 518 (1968). 
17 A.B.A., Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, Disciplinary Regulation 
2-103(0)(5). 
18 Seen. 13, supra. For examples of the 
discussion of this subject, see the 
SYmposium on the Code of Professional 
Responsibility, 48 Texas L.R. 255 
(1970). 
19 A.B.A. Spec. Comm., supra n. 15 at 
523. 
20 Sutton, The A.BA. Code of Professional 
Responsibility: An Introduction, 48 
Texas L. Rev. 255, 262 (1970). 
21 A.BA. Spec. Comm. on Availability of 
Legal Services, Report Number 1, 93 
Reports of the A.B.A. 231 (1968). 
22 A complete description of the program 
is given in the full report, The Shreve-
port Plan: An Experiment in Delivery of 
Legal Services, with the plan's official 
information booklet reprinted as its 
Appendix A. See n. 2, supra. 
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294 The operation of the Shreveport plan was 
expected to answer two types of questions. It was hoped 
that it would demonstrate that the concept was financially 
practical, as well as perhaps providing an actuarial basis for 
devising other plans. 23 And it was intended to establish a 
basis of comparison between open and closed panel 
programs in terms of their relative effectiveness in providing 
legal services and any ancillary advantages and disadvan-
tages. It is the effectiveness in providing legal services with 
which we are concerned here. 
The locale, covered group, and specific 
provisions of the plan were all settled when the A.B.F. 
researchers, including myself, entered the scene. Essentially, 
we decided on a before and after study, a panel study, of 
the experimental group. 24 Thus we interviewed all the 
members of the union local that we could before the plan 
started and again after it had been in operation for one 
year. 25 The first survey provided information about the use 
of lawyers prior to the insurance plan, which could be 
compared with use under the program. Similar comparisons 
could be made of the attitudes, before and after, toward 
the law and lawyers. The covered member surveys were 
supplemented by interviews with local lawyers. 
We recognize that there are serious difficulties 
in trying to generalize from this experiment, using one 
small group in one city for a period of only one year. 
Moreover, the particulars of the situation include poten-
tially distorting circumstances. Oddly enough, though the 
program was organized and funded as an experiment in 
legal insurance, apparently little effort was made to insure 
that the participants and conditions were "typical"-ifsuch 
assessment could ever be made-so that the results could be 
confidently generalized to the rest of the country. Indeed, 
some have wondered whether it would be possible· to devise 
more suspicious-looking, "atypical" circumstances. 
Shreveport is a southern city with a metropol-
itan population of about 300,000 about one-third of which 
is black, a 99 percent white bar, and a political and social 
ambience that would have to be described as conservative. 
It was selected as the site for the experiment because the 
Shreveport Bar Association, among all the local bar groups 
in the country, was one of the few to respond to the 
A.B.A.'s search for volunteers for the experiment with a 
proposed program, and was the only one whose program 
was ready to be put into operation. 26 
·' 
. The group to be covered by the insurance-
Local 229 of the Laborers International Union-was 
similarly selected, not because the union membership was 
"typical," but because the local and national union officials 
were viewed as likely to approve and support it, as they did. 
The membership of the group thus chosen is almost entirely 
black, mostly composed of unskilled construction laborers, 
with an average income only slightly above the poverty 
level, generally middle-aged to old, and with few years of 
formal education. The union's active membership, (which 
averaged 536) was subject to considerable turnover, 
creating a distortion for which we attempted to compensate 
by concentrating our analysis on 301 union members who 
were active both before and after the plan's imple-
mentation. 27 
Despite the possibly unrepresentative condi-
tions we believe that the experiment is relevant beyond the 
specific circumstances. Th_e most important lessons of the 
investigation do not involve the details of the legal 
insurance plan, but rather when and how people use 
lawyers. We began our examination with considerable 
skepticism, much of it based on the atypicality of the 
situation. While we are still certain that our survey results 
cannot be automatically assumed to be reflective of the 
whole nation, we now suspect, after our research, 
observation and discussion; that these lessons do apply 
elsewhere. In any event, the Shreveport data provide both a 
fair basis of speculation and indications of what to look for 
in the additional examinations of legal insurance that we 
believe necessary. It is with that caveat that we draw our 
conclusions. 
The "Middle Class Need": 
Use and Non-use of Lawyers' Services 
For all the discussion about it, the idea of a 
middle-class need for legal services is rather indefinite. 
There is, in fact, very little, if any, direct evidence that the 
middle class needs more legal service than it is actually 
getting. Preble Stolz, doing a preliminary study of the idea 
of legal insurance in 1968, examined the skimpy data 
available on the need for the public for legal services and 
observed that "the conclusion can be very briefly stated: 
The figures tell us nothing." 28 Barbara A. Curran, after a 
similar examination, has concluded that "we are abysmally 
ignorant of what the general public needs or wants or ought 
to have in the way of legal services." 29 Little is known 
about who sees lawyers for what and why. Even less is 
known about non-users of legal services. It would seem 
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295 difficult to devise a sound system for meeting a perceived 
need without knowing what that need is and why it has not 
been fulfilled, but that is largely the case here. 30 
It is probably safe to assume that there is some 
unfulfilled need, though the amount cannot be specified. 
Certainly that is the predominant opinion among both 
observers within the organized bar and representatives, such 
as union officials, of potential client groups. 
In the Shreveport study we discovered the 
difficulty of measuring this need or non-use, but still the 
study does tend to confirm the existence of unfulfilled 
need. In response to direct inquiry 5 percent of the 
members indicated that they had had a problem in the 
preceeding 12 months which they had thought of taking to 
a lawyer but did not. That 5 percent represents about half 
the number of those who actually consulted lawyers, or put 
another way, one-third of the problems for which members 
admitted they thought about using a lawyer's services were 
not taken to attorneys. We tried to find out why not, but 
were unable to get particular reasons. 
A similar impression is given by responses to a 
battery of questions in which the respondent was asked if 
he had ever experienced specific situations, chosen by us, 
which suggested the possible use of a lawyer. Though an 
attorney would not expect to be called in every such 
situation, the overwhelming majority of the union members 
who had experienced those problems had not sought a 
lawyer, even for such situations as being arrested (86 
percent did not use a lawyer) or making a will (92 percent 
did not use a lawyer). 
Why are lawyers not being consulted when it 
would otherwise seem to a person's advantage to do so? 
Unless the barriers that stand between lawyers and 
middle-class individuals are understood, it will be difficult 
to create a program that can fully overcome them. There 
has been considerable theoretical speculation concerning 
these reasons. Discussion in the context of the Shreveport 
study may provide an empirical background. 
23 The experiment failed to provide much 
information on the economics of legal 
insurance plans. The Shreveport plan 
survived its first year with its premium 
of 2 cents an hour, but it is doubtful 
whether that figure can be kept at that 
low level. We suspect that the Shreve-
port program is viable at some 
"reasonable" premium, though we 
cannot specify its magnitude. For a 
varqty of reasons, centering on 
distortions in the experiment and 
inadequate data, we cannot confidently 
generalize from the program whether 
other plans would be viable at reason-
able premiums, nor can we estimate 
what premiums might be necessary. See 
Chapter IX of the full report for the 
discussion of the economics of the plan. 
24 A detailed description of the 
methodology, copies of the survey 
instruments, and the specific statistics 
hereafter referred to may be found in 
the full report. 
25 Our first survey was conducted in July, 
1970. The plan commenced operation in 
January, 19 71, and our second survey 
was conducted in January, 1972. When 
we make before and after comparisons 
of the use of lawyers, we are comparing 
the 12-month periods prior to each set 
of interviews: July, 1969 thru June, 
1970, and January thru December of 
1971. 
26 Another site, Clackamus County, 
Oregon, was originally selected for the 
experiment, but that plan collapsed 
when the proposed group of insureds-a 
labor union-declined to accept any 
premium expense. 
27 The employment of unskilled construc-
tion laborers tends to be highly cyclical, 
and since many members pay their dues 
to remain members in good standing 
only when they have a construction job, 
the union's active membership is also 
cyclical. Members are suspended if they 
have not paid their dues for three 
months, and only active members are 
eligible under the insurance plan. During 
the year there were 1029 different 
persons who were, at one time or 
another, eligible, active members. At no 
single time during the year, however, did 
the number of eligible members exceed 
593. 
28 Stolz, The Legal Needs of the Public: A 
Survey Analysis, Research Contributions 
of the American Bar Foundation No. 4, 
1 (1968). 
29 Curran, Utilization of Lawyers' Services 
by the General Public, 36 Unauthorized 
Practice News 21 (March, 1971). 
30 Recently the ABA recognized this 
problem and created a Special Commit-
tee to Survey Legal Needs. That 
committee and the A.B.F. have begun 
such a study, but in the meantime the 
data remain fragmentary. 
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financial one. The idea of middle-class need is largely based 
on the notion that these people do not use lawyers because 
they are not wealthy enough to afford them, while being 
too affluent to qualify for legal aid. Thus one observer 
concluded that "full, effective legal assistance is beyond the 
reach of both middle-income and poor Americans." No 
doubt this is true for so-called "catastrophic" legal 
problems, like major criminal charges or large liability 
claims. 
It is a mistake to view the problem simply as 
one of high fees, however. Professor Stolz's review 
concluded that "most of the need for legal services is either 
covered by liability insurance or a contingent fee or is likely 
to be inexpensive." 32 Few of the legal problems of 
middle-income persons require extensive effort by lawyers. 
The actual fees charged the Shreveport laborers do not 
constitute an insurmountable barrier. For half the problems 
that had been taken to lawyers before the plan the charge 
was less than $75. Most members were able fo pay the fees 
from cash on hand. When asked if they could afford the 
fee, only 28 percent said they could not, a view that did 
not vary with size of income. Even for the few fees over 
$300 (only 8 percent of the total number of problems), 
only SO percent of the respondents said they could not 
afford what they had been charged. This group hits an 
average income deep in the lower portion of the ''middle 
class" and several members had incomes beneath the 
poverty level for at least some years of their lives, yet their 
·e~perience has not indicated a substantial inability to pay 
legal fees for the kinds of problems they generally face. 
What financial barrier exists is not based on 
inability to afford the attorneys' fees so much as it is on the 
fear of such fees. The problem is not one of overcoming 
catastrophic costs, but relieving the concern over potential 
cost. This fear must be faced before consulting the lawyer 
and getting the bill. A given problem might actually result 
in a small charge if taken to a lawyer, but the person with 
the problem might not know that, and so he may still be 
frightened away by the potential danger of being handed a 
huge bill. The members were asked to agree or disagree with 
the statement "Most of the time lawyers charge too inuch." 
Despite the statement's built-in bias, the strength of the 
response is still instructive: 84 percent agreed. The response 
did not vary according to past experience, either. The view 
is obviously a strong one which does not change even when 
experience has been to the contrary. Doubts about "next 
time" may remain. 
The financial barrier to using legal services 
would thus appear to be built more on a fear of large fees 
rather than actually heavy expenses. This is the kind of 
obstacle against which a pooled-risk system, either open- or 
closed-panel, would seem particularly effective, in that it 
could eliminate the fear by fixing limited actual expenses, 
high premiums being unnecessary since "catastrophic" 
expenses are so rare. 
Even when the fear element is included 
however, the financial barrier may not be as important as is 
generally believed. This was the conclusion of an A.B.F. 
study of the use of legal services by low-income people, 
observing that almost 75 percent of the respondents (the 
survey was of poor persons who had used a lawyer within 
the preceding five years) had contacted a private attorney 
instead of the local free legal service program. 33 
In Shreveport, of the 407 problems taken to 
lawyers before the insurance plan and identified to us by 
the members, (many of whom had incomes below the 
poverty level for large parts of their lives) only 3 cases had 
been taken to legal aid and 6 to the public defender. In the 
12 month period before our survey, 53 problems had been 
taken to lawyers, all to private attorneys. Shreveport has an 
active legal aid office, but when the union members decide 
to see an attorney they appear willing to risk the financial 
burden. The economic barrier may be a significant one, but 
there are others as well. · 
An early stage in deciding to take a certain 
problem to an attorney is identifying it as a "legal" 
problem, a task in which, of course, a lawyer would be of 
some help. Failure to recognize legal problems may be a 
significant factor in the non-use of legal services. Though 
the evolution of legal doctrine designed to protect 
individuals-as criminal defendants, consumers, tenants, 
employees, and so on-has been substantial, the individuals 
for whom these protections exist may not be aware of 
them. 
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297 Moreover, the complexity of modern society is 
making the recognition of a problem as "legal" harder than 
before. Consumer credit serves as an example. A borrower 
early in this century was likely to have a relatively clear and 
complete understanding of his legal obligations, but with 
the spread of credit cards, complex purchase agreements, 
and "easy credit" schemes this is frequently not the case 
today. Judicial rulings limiting the terms or requiring . 
certain procedures and disclosures are also likely to be 
unknown to the consumer. 
An individual with casual or random contacts 
with lawyers is probably unfamiliar with the nature of their 
services and beset by doubts about what kind of matters are 
appropriate to take to attorneys. Such doubts encourage a 
tendency to see a lawyer, if at all, only in the case of easily 
recognized "traditional" legal matters, the staple stuff of 
law practice for many years-real estate transactions, 
divorces, criminal offenses, estates, and workman's 
compensation claims. That was the actual experience in 
Shreveport prior to the insurance program, and the A.B.F. 
study of low-income persons resulted in similar findings. 34 
When faced with hypothetical situations and asked whether 
a lawyer could be helpful, the respondents in the A.B.F. 
study reflected these conservative or conventional views of 
what are "legal" problems. 
Furthermore, doubts about what are appropri-
ate matters to take to lawyefs produce a hesitancy about 
seeking lawyers until the problem becomes serious. 
Ambiguity about what is and what is not a legal problem 
especially inhibits the use of attorneys in a preventive 
mode. While a questionable situation could have been taken 
to a lawyer for consultation, to be either disposed of by 
advice that the problem was not a legal one or settled 
quickly and easily before it became serious and more 
complicated, the union members reported only one such 
occurrence before the institution of the insurance plan. 
This "knowledgeability gap" thus appears to be 
a second barrier to full, effective use of legal services. The 
possible utility of attorneys is not wholly recognized by 
potential clients, and then doubts translate into non-use or 
delayed use. The extent to which group legal arrangements 
can bridge this gap is unclear. Especially if linked with an 
educational program, the potential seems to exist for 
increased awareness of lawyers as a problem-solving 
resource, especially through word-of-mouth advertising by 
members discovering the greater utility of attorneys. 
32 Stolz, supra n. 12 at 454. 
33 Curran, supra n. 18 at 23. It was not 
clear why free legal services were not 
utilized more. Certainly lack of 
knowledge-38 percent were unaware 
that the free programs existed-played 
an important part. Two related attitudes 
were also involved: suspicion about 
institutionalized charity and the belief 
that private attorneys were more likely 
to do everything they could to help. 
34 Marks, The Legal Needs of the Poor: A 
Critical Analysis, 8 (1971). 
Once a person has realized that an attorney 
might be able to help with a given problem, there still 
remains the decision to seek such help. The first does not 
always lead to the second, for there a:re major psychological 
barriers which make it difficult to take that step even when 
it is seen to be for the person's own good and which, when 
the lawyer's utility is uncertain, help clinch the decision not 
to seek him out. When a person goes to a professional there 
is a felt loss of control over both process and outcome. The 
matter may be viewed as "in the hands of the lawyer," the 
client feeling powerless. Furthermore, going to a lawyer 
seems to many to involve a commitment to a formal, 
legalistic resolution, which creates a sense of vulnerability 
to counter-attack. Seeing an attorney-electing a legal 
resolution-converts a painful, often intimate, problem into 
an object for the ministrations of others, who proceed at 
their own pace, on their own terms, and by their own often 
incomprehensible rules. 
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before, the Shreveport respondents tended to believe that 
most lawyers could not be trusted (60 percent so thought) 
and were hard to understand (77 percent). The members of 
this group may have had a greater than usual economic and 
social distance from the practicing bar because of their race 
and marginal economic status, but negative attitudes 
toward lawyers are not limited to such groups. It is no 
secret that lawyers are not popular, especially among the 
"common people." (When a Shakespearian butcher and his 
friends thought about what they would do if they were in 
power, the conclusion was clear: ''The first thing we do, 
let's kill all the lawyers." 35 ) The public distrusts the law 
and its institutions, viewing it as a "last resort" when all 
else has failed. 36 
The fear of law and lawyers is a fundamental 
element in the non-use of legal services. No plan of legal 
services, open- or closed-panel, is likely to change basic 
attitudes except on a very long term basis. In the short run, 
however, increasing successful individual contacts with 
attorneys might reduce the operational effect-discouraging 
use of lawyers-of the negative attitudes. Thus, the impact 
of negative expressed opinions about lawyers in general 
might be minimized if the members of a legal services plan 
knew or could find particular lawyers with whom they 
could have satisfactory relationships. 
That brings us to a final element in taking a 
problem to a lawyer: finding a good one. Selection among 
competitive products is a common process in our society. 
There may often be doubts in a consumer's mind over 
which is the right choice, but usually there is some 
reasonable or at least explicable basis for the decision. Even 
for a major purchase like an automobile where simple 
trial-and-error is impractical, some "objective" standards 
exist: the consumer can check specifications and perform-
ance data, he can read Consumer Reports, he can take a test 
drive-there are some reasonable grounds for decision. 
The selection of a lawyer is much more 
difficult. 37 For one thing the pot.ential "consumer" of legal 
services is left to his own devices. There is no formal 
advertising, and lawyer referral services, where they exist, 
give out names but do not indicate quality. On his own, the 
consumer has no objective basis for selecting a satisfactory 
attorney-meaning one who is both competent for handling 
the specific problem and personally likely to be trusted by 
the particular client-for his situation. He is forced to 
depend on word-of-mouth reputation. 
That basis for selection may have worked in 
small-town America, where the typical attorney practiced 
in a relatively settled, homogeneous, closely-knit communi-
ty. There the effective and efficient "grapevine" could 
spread reputations-personal and professional-rapidly, and 
a few inquiries could provide some basis of choice among 
the available attorneys. 38 But small-town America is no 
longer the norm. For urban dwellers the number of 
available attorneys is much larger, and relatively reliable 
information about the ability of any one of them to deal 
with various problems is far less likely to travel among the 
general population. In addition, the complexity of modern 
law has resulted in specialization, though not formally 
recognized, by most attorneys. The profession's Code of 
Professional Responsibility itself concedes that "Few 
attorneys are willing and competent to deal with every kind 
of legal matter, and many laymen have difficulty in 
determining the competence of lawyers to render different 
types of legal service." 39 Nonetheless, except for the 
traditional exceptions for admiralty, trademark, and patent 
law, no lawyer is allowed to "hold himself out as a 
specialist or as having special training or ability." 40 
The difficulty of selection may further 
discourage consultation of lawyers. The potential user, 
faced with the unappetizing prospect of picking a name at 
random or on the basis of the dubious remains of the 
word-of-mouth system, may well choose to forget the 
whole thing. About half of the Shreveport respondents 
expressed the view that it was hard to find a lawyer. In 
addition, the contacts used to find lawyers before the 
insurance plan reflected the "lay referral network," or 
word-of-mouth system, with over half the referrals coming 
from friends and relatives. And of those who had experi-
ence with this system, about half thought that lawyers were 
hard to find, which further suggests that the referrals may 
not have led to successful lawyer-client contacts. Not only 
is such a result bad in itself, but it may discourage future 
use of legal services by those individuals and by others 
influenced by them. 
The difficulty of finding a lawyer is a crucial 
factor in the choice between open- and closed-panel 
arrangements. The closed-panel plan pre-selects the lawyer 
for the member by referring him to a particular lawyer or, 
at most, giving him a short list to choose from. The 
organizing group, presumably having screened and approved 
the lawyer in advance, takes the worry and guesswork out 
of the selection process and provides the member with 
grounds for putting his faith in the chosen attorney. 41 On 
the other hand, the existing "free choice" afforded the 
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299 potential client, outside of any program, turns out to 
produce discouragement, confusion, and unsuccessful 
contacts. If these patterns are left intact in the open-panel 
program, as is generally assumed, a substantial barrier to 
full and effective use of legal services would remain 
untouched. Whether these patterns persist in open-panel 
programs remains to be seen, but this contact barrier 
certainly demands careful examination. 
In sum, it would appear that there is a 
significant need for attorneys' services among middle-
·income people that is unmet at present, though the extent 
of that legal service gap cannot be established. It stems in 
part from a fear of the financial cost of consul ting a lawyer, 
but that is only part of the explanation. Other barriers 
separating lawyers and potential middle-income clients are 
present: nonrecognition of the utility of lawyers' services, 
psychological reluctance to turn to lawyers, and difficulties 
in finding a good attorney. The strength of each of these 
elements and how they interact with themselves and with 
other factors is uncertain. Basic research is still needed to 
understand the relationship between middle-class citizens 
on one hand and the law and lawyers on the other. In the 
meantime, we work with what knowledge we have. 
The Impact of Legal Insurance 
As noted earlier, the Shreveport experiment 
was intended to test the practicality of legal insurance and 
to provide a basis of comparison for open-panel plans 
against the alternative of group legal services. Unlike the 
complete report on the project, however, this article is 
concerned with only one aspect, albeit the most important, 
the availability and use of legal services by the covered 
members. For the other results and a more extensive 
discussion of this aspect, the full report should be 
consulted. 
The use of legal services by the members of 
Local 229 increased significantly under the insurance 
program. In the 12 months prior to the first interview, 10.3 
percent of the members used lawyers. Under the insurance 
plan that figure jumped to 16.3 percent. Moreover, the 
quality of legal service provided increased noticeably under 
the plan, according to both the member-clients and the 
lawyers who represented them. Of those members who had 
seen lawyers both before and under the plan, half thought 
that they had been given better service and the rest 
detected no decline. Similarly, many lawyers thought that 
35 W. Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, Act 
IV, scene ii, line 86. 
36 See the Missouri study, which attempted 
to determine public attitudes toward 
lawyers. Missouri Bar-Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., A Motivational Study of Public 
Attitudes and Law Office Management 
(1963). 
For an excellent discussion of these 
problems, see Christensen, supra n. 5, 
ch. 4. 
38 A personal description of the small-town 
model is given by Charles Hackler in 
Institute of Industrial Relations, 
U.C.L.A., Group Legal Services: 
Proceedings of a Conference on Prepaid 
and Group Legal-Aid Plans 17-18 
(1969). 
39 A.B.A., Code of Professional Responsi-
bility, Ethical Consideration 2-7. 
40 Id., Ethical Consideration 2-14. 
41 At least this is the theory. Whether this 
is how the system would operate and 
what effect, if any, it would have on the 
quality of service is not known. 
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insurance program, and in return the attorneys provided 
better service. It must be conceded, however, that these 
results, significant as they seem, are from only the first year 
of this one experiment. A more comprehensive view 
requires analyzing the effect of the insurance plan on each 
of the barriers separating potential clients and lawyers. 
In theory, the insurance program should 
eliminate the financial fear of lawyers. At least that is true 
for the Shreveport coverage, which leaves only small 
amounts, if any, to be paid by the individual client. 42 But 
given this group and the short time the program has been in 
effect, we suspect that the financial concern has not yet 
been entirely relieved in the minds of some members. 
Indeed, we know that some members of the union either 
were not aware of the plan or did not understand it, since 
there were at least five instances of members actually 
incurring legal expenses during the year without the 
knowledge that these expenses were covered by the plan. 
Given time, this kind of discrepancy should be eliminated. 
The difficulty of recognizing when a lawyer can 
be of help is not so easily alleviated. The kinds of things for 
which the members used lawyers' services did not change 
under the insurance plan; they were still the traditional 
types of problems. The hypothetical questions revealed a 
broader view of lawyer utility, but not a more sophisticated 
one. In the second survey, after the plan year, for each 
described situation more people thought of a lawyer as 
being helpful than had in the first survey. There were no 
significant differentiations according to problem type. This 
broader view included even a situation for which a "lawyer 
helpful" response seems questionable-"a person has lost 
his wallet." The responses to that situation, in fact, 
(although the percentage of those saying lawyers would be 
helpful was lowest here), showed the greatest increase 
before and after: 21 percent to 36 percent. The change 
indicates that lawyers are being thought of more, but not 
that the group's members are really more accurately aware 
of when a lawyer can be of assistance. Greater sophisti-
cation may come with time and experience, perhaps with 
the help of an educational program that could be run 
through the union group and plan, but it has not been 
manifested in the plan's first year. 
There is one encouraging sign that is relevant 
here, however, and that is an·increased use of attorneys for 
advice only. Only one such use had been reported before 
the plan, but during its first year the plan paid for five such 
claims. The number remains small, but the development 
permits a cautious inference that the plan may encourage 
members to take problems to lawyers before the situation 
in question becomes so aggravated as to force further 
action, suggesting a potential for the preventive use of 
lawyers. 
As suggested in our original discussion of the 
psychological barriers to the use of legal services, one year's 
operation of the legal insurance program had little effect on 
existing negative attitudes toward the law and lawyers. 
There were signs, though, tha.t the insurance plan and the 
services received under it were distinguished from the 
negative attitudes in the members' minds. Most respondents 
believed that lawyers would treat them better under 
insurance coverage, and those with experience with lawyers 
both before and under the plan-those who experienced 
this treatment first-hand-agreed. The clients and potential 
clients, when asked about the difference, seemed to feel 
that the lawyer would have to pay attention to them in a 
way he had not before, and that the client would no longer 
be alone and unsupported in approaching the lawyer. 
Vague as these responses are, the importance of 
a growing feeling of social and institutional support cannot 
be overemphasized. It is clear evidence of the breakdown of 
previous feelings of isolation that had certainly inhibited 
the group in their dealings with lawyers. This feeling of 
social and institutional support should provide the kind of 
psychological confidence that is a necessary basis for more 
sophisticated and aggressive use of legal services in the 
future. Changes like these will naturally take time to 
establish their full effect, but at least some bridging of the 
sense of distance between the insured members and lawyers 
is evident. Some degree of distance or uneasiness will 
probably always exist-seeing a lawyer will not be as 
routine as going to the supermarket-but a legal insurance 
program may be able to reduce the barriers so that they do 
not serve as serious impediments to access to lawyers. 
The effect of legal insurance on the methods of 
selecting attorneys is crucial insofar as programs using the 
concept are offered as an alternative to closed-panel plans. 
We noted earlier that there seemed to be serious weaknesses 
in the ways of choosing lawyers before the insurance plan. 
Though it may not have been expected, the Shreveport plan 
had the effect of significantly altering the contact pattern. 
11
Clifton: The Shreveport Plan for Providing Legal Services
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 1973
301 A more organized referral network developed. Informal, 
unstructured contacts were in part replaced by reliance on 
referrals by union officials and community reputation. It 
would seem natural, with the plan being offered through 
the union, that many members seeking a lawyer would ask 
union officers for information about the plan and about 
p0ssible lawyers to hire. Any sense of group participation 
would encourage this process. It also follows that the union 
official, wanting to establish both his own and the plan's 
credibility and being in a position to get feedback from 
other users, would want to suggest a lawyer who would be 
effective and sympathetic to the member. The emergence 
of a referral system simply labelled as "community 
reputation" has similar implications, since it apparently 
indicates reputation within this particular union group. 
Members have experiences with lawyers and develop an 
opinion of the utility of individual attorneys; such 
information acquiring a currency within the group. In a 
way, this "community" represents a throw-back to the 
circumstances of the small-town model: a small, homogene-
ous group with similar problems exchanging information 
about individual lawyers. We would expect this kind of 
referral to grow as the plan continues. 
The new referral patterns resulted in greater 
satisfaction and less complaint about the difficulties of 
finding a lawyer. Before the plan about half of the members 
agreed that it was hard to find a lawyer, regardless of 
respondent's prior !gal experience. In the second survey, 
however, only 34 percent of those who found lawyers 
under the insurance plan agreed that lawyers were hard to 
find, while 53 percent of those without plan experience 
agreed. Of course, these figures still show, first, that 
one-third of the users under the new program remained 
dissatisfied, and, further, that awareness of the difference 
has not spread to those without actual experience. Whether 
these levels of dissatisfaction will be reduced with time and 
greater experience as well as how these figures would 
compare with the results of a closed-panel plan remains to 
be seen. In addition, should proposals be adopted by the 
bar to make selection of attorneys easier-for instance by 
permitting open specialization-they would have an effect 
that would also have to be taken into account. 
42 Other proposed plans called "legal 
insurance" are radically different, as 
that offered in Stolz, supra n. 12 at 
455-76. Stolz formulated a model plan 
the benefits of which were essentially 
limited to exactly what the premium 
paid for-one hour of consultation with 
a lawyer each year. Such a plan is not 
"insurance" in the pooled risk sense, but 
instead more like enforced budgeting, as 
a Christmas Club savings plan, and 
would not eliminate the risk of heavy 
legal fees. , 
43 The Shreveport plan was initially 
planned to run for at least 3 years, or 
until January, 1974. Whether there will 
be any attempt to examine the 3-year 
experience is not known. · 
The new, "community" referral system also 
casts some doubt on the importance of "free choice" of 
lawyers. The Shreveport experiment did not show it to 
mean very much .. To some extent referrals within the union 
group, especially
1 
by its officials, obscure the difference 
between open- and closed-panel plans. If this trend 
continues it is conceivable that a de facto "closed panel" 
will be created. Such a development might represent the 
worst of both worlds: group decision-making may be 
involved without anybody taking formal responsibility for 
it. Accordingly, there may be a greater threat to the 
lawyer-client relationship from de facto closed panels than 
from intentionally closed panels. 
However, if client-members acquire a real sense 
of autonomy, the open-panel plan, even with the de facto 
closed-panel effect, could turn these potential vices into 
virtues. The member could receive more accurate and 
organized information about lawyers to aid him in his 
selection while maintaining his sense of independence and 
power over the lawyer. This depends intimately on the 
ability to fire or change the lawyer that one chooses. The 
issue of free choice will have to be watched extremely 
closely in other, more substantial, experiments with legal 
insurance. 
Our observation of the Shreveport experiment 
leads us to conclude that a system of legal insurance seems 
to be an effective method of delivering legal services. Given 
the barriers between middle-income individuals and lawyers 
that inhibit the use of legal services, the concept in action 
seems to go a long way toward ove~coming those barriers. 
This is not to suggest that it is the most effective or 
efficient method for the delivery of legal services, for our 
examination gives us no basis for judging what would be 
accomplished by alternative systems, including closed-panel 
plans. Nor do we know enough about the long-term effects 
of an insurance program to make any "final" choice now. 
It is, in fact, far too early to concentrate on 
which delivery system may be most efficient. If a substan-
tial unfulfilled need for legal services exists, as it apparently 
does, legal insurance seems to operate in the right direction 
and so should be encouraged. Meanwhile, research into the 
extent and reasons for the unfulfilled need-"market 
research" for legal services-should .be undertaken so that 
plans to meet the particular problems can be constructed 
and operated. Experimentation and observation of various 
systems should be conducted to determine what their 
capabilities actually are. 43 
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